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Voters as Fiduciaries
Edward B. Foleyt

INTRODUCTION

This essay employs Rawlsian political philosophy to argue
that voters, like jurors and soldiers, should be understood as
holding a public office. As such, voters owe a fiduciary duty to
act on behalf of all inhabitants of the polity, rather than to
advance their own self-interests. This duty extends not only to
the polity's current inhabitants, but also to all anticipated future
generations of inhabitants.
Understanding the role of voters as fiduciaries has
implications for Evenwel v. Abbott,' the case recently granted
plenary review by the U.S. Supreme Court to consider whether
states, when drawing legislative districts, must endeavor to
equalize the number of voters or residents in those districts.
Once one recognizes that voters represent, not themselves, but
the totality of residents in their community, then it becomes
apparent that legislative districts should be apportioned based
on total population, rather than just the population of
the electorate.
The argument proceeds in stages. It is first presented
intuitively, using in particular the topic of environmental
protection to explain its "common sense" quality. Then, in the
bulk of the essay, the argument is presented more formally,
using the philosophical method of Rawls's famous "original

.

t Director, Election Law at Moritz, & Charles W. Ebersold and Florence Whitcomb
Ebersold Chair in Constitutional Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.
I would like to thank Jocelyn Benson, Richard Briffault, Chris Elmendorf, Eitan Hersh,
Ethan Leib, Dakota Rudesill, Eliezer Poupko, and Piers Turner for comments on an
early draft. To the extent that I have not yet addressed fully the various points that they
have raised, I hope to do so in further exploration of the voters-as-fiduciaries idea, which
is set forth here in its initial-not necessarily final-incarnation.
1 Appeal docketed, No. 14-940 (U.S. May 26, 2014). The Scotusblog page for the
case contains the jurisdictional-stage briefs, available here: http://www.scotusblog.com/
case-files/cases/evenwel-v-abbott
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position" and its "veil of ignorance" to derive the voter's role in
the governance of society. This role, the Rawlsian analysis
shows, is not to enable voters to benefit themselves by casting
ballots, but to enable voters to elect legislatures that will better
serve the public interest than if voters did not play this role.
All the while, this essay endeavors to explain that
understanding the role of the voter in this Rawlsian way is not
antithetical to a vigorous enforcement of voting rights, and thus
we shall start with laying the foundation for this
particular point.
I.

VOTING RIGHTS-AND RESPONSIBILITIES

On the fiftieth anniversary of the Voting Rights Act, 2 our

nation is appropriately celebrating the transformative expansion
of voting rights that the Act wrought. In particular, we justly
celebrate the Act's commitment to eradicating racial
discrimination in voting rights. For a century, the Fifteenth
Amendment's promise of equal voting rights regardless of race
seemed an empty gesture, but the 1965 Act changed that. Let us
hope that we never slide back to the point where, as a practical
matter, the ability to cast a ballot turns on the color of
one's skin.
The very title of the Voting Rights Act also signified an
important cultural shift in the nation's understanding of, and
expectation of, what it means to be a voter. As a citizen, one has
the right to vote, like the right to free speech or the right to
personal autonomy as reflected in such decisions as Griswold v.
Connecticut.3 It is not entirely coincidental that Griswold was
decided the same year as the enactment of the Voting Rights
Act; both are of the same era. Indeed, the Sixties brought about
a new mindset about the primacy of personal rights, including
the rights to be whoever you want to be and to express yourself
accordingly (whether through your clothes, your hairstyle, or
other aspects of your personal lifestyle), as well as the new
insistence on the protection of voting rights. 4
Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. Previously codified in Title 42 of the U.S.
Code, the
Voting Rights Act recently has been re-codified in Title 52: http://uscode.house.gov/
editorialreclassification/t52/QuickChart for.Voting RightsAct_1965.pdf.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2

See generally, e.g.,

MORRIS DICKSTEIN, GATES OF EDEN: AMERICAN CULTURE IN

THE SIXTIES (1977); TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE (1993).
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To a considerable extent, the attitudes about personal rights
and voting rights that blossomed in the Sixties merged. Voting
came to be seen as a personal right, just one of the new clusters
of personal rights to be pursued.5 It is my right to vote, and I get
to assert it in the way that I deem best. From the perspective of
the Sixties, voting is an exercise of self-expression, just as is
wearing a jacket that vehemently protests the Vietnam War.6
Moreover, since voting is my right, I get to advance my personal
interests (however I choose to define them) through the exercise
of casting a ballot, just as I get to advance my personal interests
(as I determine them) by the clothes I wear, the music I listen to,
and the friendships I choose to pursue.
With voting rights understood this way, electoral democracy
becomes nothing more than just the arithmetical aggregation of
all these assertions of self-expression in the ballot box. I want x;
you want y; to determine which of us prevails insofar as x and y
conflict, let's count up the number of those in favor of x, and
then count the number in favor of y, and see which is larger.
Majority rules.7
This simplistic vision of democracy is powerful. Whole fields
of political science are premised on the hypothesis that voters do
simply vote in their self-interest, as they see it, when they cast
their ballots. 8 The haves tend to vote for candidates that will
See also generally JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES,

1945-74 (1997). Hair, the rock musical, epitomized this aspect of the era. See JAMES
RADO ET AL., HAIR: THE AMERICAN TRIBAL LOVE-ROCK MUSICAL (1967); ELIZABETH L.
WOLLMAN, THE THEATER WILL ROCK: A HISTORY OF THE ROCK MUSICAL, FROM HAIR TO

HEDWIG (2006).
" See D. GRIER STEPHENSON JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES

UNDER THE LAW 250-53 (2004) (linking the cultural revolution of the 1960s with the
movement for under-21 voting rights). See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO
VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 2009)

(the leading history of laws regulating the extent of the franchise).
6 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Public choice theory examines the procedural rules by which groups make
decisions. One basic question is whether to let individuals assert preferences through the
mechanism of free market choices, or instead whether the particular matter requires a
collective choice binding on all. If the latter, then problems of agenda-setting emerge, as
it has been mathematically demonstrated that the outcome chosen may depend on the
order in which multiple alternatives are considered. Nonetheless, it is generally believed
that some form of majority rule is required, because the only alternative is minority rule,
which is mathematically less preferable if each voter's preferences are supposed to count
equally. See generally ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989). The broader
public choice literature is vast. See generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III
(2003).
8 See generally, e.g., WILLLM H. FLANIGAN & NANCY H. ZINGALE, THE POLITICAL
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protect what they have, while the have-nots tend to support
politicians in favor of redistributing wealth.
Politics, however, is not merely about who has how much
wealth, but instead encompasses other matters (such as social
policies concerning marriage, divorce, child rearing, education,
and the like). Consequently, the electorate will divide into a
multiplicity of narrower "interest groups"; each trying to
maximize the chances of achieving its objectives, in part by
entering coalitions with other such interest groups. 9 This
"interest-group pluralism" model of voting thus assumes that
political parties will organize around different sets of these
coalitions, and voters will determine which party more closely
aligns with their own overall self-interest.1 0
This interest-group pluralism model of voting, moreover,
reinforces the need to emphasize the right of each voter to
participate in this process by casting his or her own ballot. If all
other citizens are pursuing their own self-interests when casting
a ballot, then each individual citizen needs to be able to do the
same, so that his or her own self-interest does not get left out of
the overall arithmetical aggregation of asserted interests. I have
the same right to have my assertion of self-interest added to the
overall calculus as everyone else does.n

BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE (12th ed. 2015); WULF GAERTNER, A PRIMER IN
SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY (2009); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL

CONNECTION (1974); Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Pocketbook Voting in U.S. National Election
Studies, 29 AM. J. POL. Scl. 348 (1985); Stanley Feldman, Economic Self-Interest and the
Vote: Evidence and Meaning, 6 POL. BEHAV. 229 (1984). The most popular expression of
this idea came in the 1992 election, when James Carville reminded then-candidate Bill
Clinton that "it's the economy, stupid." See JAMES PATTERSON, RESTLESS GIANT 252
(2007).
There is evidence, however, that voters attempt to vote their perceptions of the
public interest, rather than attempting to use their ballots to advance their own selfinterests. See JASON BRENNAN, THE ETHICS OF VOTING 202 n. 2 (2011) (collecting
authorities for this point). If that were true, it would support the claim that voters are
willing to see their role in government as fiduciaries. But, as Brennan himself
acknowledges, this evidence is contrary to the prevailing "commonsense" perception,
which is that "voters vote for their self-interest." Id. at 161.
I shall leave the evidentiary debate to the empiricists. My normative claim is that
voters should vote for the common good, as best they can determine it-and so much the
better if voters are actually doing so.
9 See MUELLER, supra note 7, at 472-500.
10 See id. Thus, voters might have to decide between competing priorities, as when
the party more aligned with their economic interests might not be the party more
aligned with their social policy interests.
"' See generally, e.g., CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY (1989); ROBERT A.
DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989).
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A half-century after the Sixties, there is no denying that
this vision of democracy is culturally prevalent. But it is not the
only vision, or even the most desirable vision, of democracy.
Democracy, I shall argue, is not best understood as merely the
aggregation of egotistical preferences. Instead, democracy
should be conceived of as citizens equally participating in the
opportunity to determine what is best for society as a whole.
According to this alternative vision, voters do not-or at least
should not-endeavor to advance their own personal selfinterest when they cast ballots. Instead, they should attempt to
advance their considered judgment about what would be most
conducive to the public interest, recognizing that the polity itself
is an ongoing enterprise to be nourished so that it can thrive. 12
This alternative vision of democracy emphasizes that voters
are responsible to the public interest when they cast their
ballots. 13 Voting should be viewed as an act of public service,
akin to jury service. Voters perform a public, not personal,
function when they vote-just as they perform a public, not
personal, function when they serve on a jury. 14 In essence, to be
a voter is to hold a public office within a democratic system of
government, just as to be a juror is to hold a public office within
the criminal justice system.15
The office of voter as a component of government is most
easily seen in the context of direct democracy, which comes in
two forms: (1) the old-fashioned town meeting and (2) the more
modern plebiscitary practice of putting referendums or other
forms of policy proposals directly on the ballot for the voters to
embrace or reject as if they were members of the legislature. But
we should also see voters as performing a government function

12

See generally, e.g., DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS

(James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997) [hereinafter DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY];
AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS F. THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004).

Insofar as an affluent citizen argues against redistributive taxation on the ground
that such taxation will harm the poor, and not just the rich, the argument (if sincere) is
not motivated by selfishness, but instead by a conception of the public interest. Whether
it is a sound argument about what best serves the public interest is debatable, but it is
an argument of the correct kind.
13

See DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 12, at xiii-xvii.

See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 12. See also generally Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989).
's For the argument that jurors owe fiduciary duties to the public, see Ethan J.
Leib, Michael Serota & David L. Ponet, Fiduciary Principles and the Jury, 55 WM.
MARY L. REV. 1109 (2014).
&

14
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when they elect the members of the legislature. Members of the
legislature are public functionaries when they appoint administrators to engage in more hands-on administration of the
government's policies and programs. So too are voters public
functionaries when they choose the members of the legislature
to adopt the government's policies and programs. In each
instance, it is one level of public authority delegating more
specific responsibilities to another, either the legislature
delegating to the administrators, or the voters delegating to the
legislature. In both cases, however, the authority making the
delegation has the responsibility to do so in accordance with its
best judgment about the public interest. Thus, in electing
members of the legislature, voters have the responsibility to
make their choice in accordance with their conception of the
public interest, not their personal self-interest.16
Emphasizing this responsibility of voters is not inconsistent
with a robust protection of voting rights. Just as all citizens
have the equal right to exercise the responsibility of being a
juror, so too all citizens have the equal right to exercise the
responsibility of being a voter. There must be no racial
discrimination in the opportunity for jury service,1 7 and so too
there must be no racial discrimination in the opportunity to
serve as a member of the electorate. But while this alternative,
responsibility-oriented vision of democracy does not negate the
imperative of protecting voting rights, it does change the
understanding of what voting rights are for. They are not for the
equal right to pursue self-interest, but rather for the equal right
to serve the public interest.

1s Michael Serota and Ethan Leib make the argument that voters in the context of
direct democracy have the same fiduciary duty to act in the public interest as members
of the legislature, but they stipulate that this same duty does not apply to voters when
they elect the legislature's members. See Serota & Leib, The PoliticalMorality of Voting
in Direct Democracy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1596 (2013). They premise their argument on the
assertion that, in the context of direct democracy, voters are representatives of the
populace as a whole, whereas in the context of candidate elections they see each voter as
representing only herself or himself. My argument is that Serota and Leib are mistaken
precisely in their unduly narrow conception of voters in candidate elections. In this
context as well as in direct democracy (for the Rawlsian reasons I articulate), voters
should be understood as representing the populace as a whole, and not only themselves.
Thus, the fiduciary duty that Serota and Leib identify as applicable to voters in the
context of direct democracy should extend to candidate elections.
" See generally Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), one of the first and
most important cases interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.
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Even before the Sixties, African-Americans insisted uponand secured-the equal right to serve in the military, not for the
sake of personal self-interest, but for the egalitarian dignity
inherent in the equal opportunity to make the ultimate sacrifice
on behalf of one's country.1 8 Stripped of the excesses of egoism
associated with the "me generation" that came of age in the
Sixties, voting rights can be understood as a parallel to the
equal right to serve in the military or to serve on a juryessential to the equal dignity of all citizens regardless of race (or
other irrelevant factors). But voting rights understood this way
is not currently the dominant model. Instead, voting rights as a
form of "consumer" empowerment is.19 Thus, if the current
egotistical model of democracy is to be replaced with the
responsibility-oriented alternative, what can be said in favor of
the latter?
THE ELECTORATE, THE GOVERNMENT OF CITIZENS, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT

II.

Sometimes, the term "self-government" is used to signify
democracy, as if rule by the people (popular sovereignty) were
synonymous with the electorate ruling itself.2 0 But even in a
democracy that attempts to realize universal adult suffrage,
there is an inevitable gap between the class of citizens eligible to
serve as part of the electorate (the governors) and the class of
citizens to whom the laws apply (the governed). Children are the
most obvious part of the gap: they must obey the laws even if
they have no say in the making of them. Still, they can expect to
grow up and be part of the governing group, and so maybe for
them democracy is just deferred self-government. 2 1

13
President Truman desegregated the military in 1948 with Exec. Order No. 9,981,
13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948). He did so in response to the compelling moral claims
advanced in the aftermath of World War Two by the civil rights community. See

PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS, supra note 4, at 150.
19

See RICHARD DAGGER, CIVIC VIRTUES: RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND REPUBLICAN

LIBERALISM 104-08 (1997)
citizenship).
20

(describing, but lamenting,

this "consumer" model of

See generally, e.g., ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE LIMITS OF SELF-

GOVERNMENT (2010).
21
In showing the inevitable gap between citizens and voters, even in a society
aspires to universal adult suffrage, I set aside the issue of immigration and the fact
noncitizens will live in the society, some lawfully and others not. Noncitizens
eventually become citizens, depending upon the society's naturalization policies.
some citizens will never become voters.

that
that
may
But
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There are, however, adult citizens who never will be part of
the electorate: the severely mentally disabled. It is fortunate
that numerically they are only a small subset of society. But
conceptually it is important to recognize that the citizens who
can vote have ethical obligations to make sure that the laws of
society are fair to the relatively few adult citizens who lack the
mental capacity to cast a ballot. Society's health care policies
must determine what share of society's resources should be
devoted to the care and well-being of citizens whose mental
disabilities are so severe that they are unable to participate in
the formulation of social policy. They cannot assert their selfinterest in an electoral process designed merely to aggregate the
assertions of self-interest of all voters. Instead, the voters of the
society have a responsibility, at a minimum, to consider the
interests of these non-voters along with their own self-interest
when deciding which candidates to support in the casting of
their ballots.
The same point applies to the growing number of citizens
who in their later years suffer from acute dementia, like
Alzheimer's disease, which makes it impossible for them to vote.
These elderly citizens used to be able to vote, unlike the few who
throughout their entire adult life have extreme cognitive
impairments. Even so, we cannot and do not expect the voters
who later will suffer from dementia to plan for that contingency
and thus adequately protect their self-interest during the time
when they can vote (before their dementia sets in, thereby
depriving them of the ability to vote). Instead, we can and
should expect all eligible voters to act in the best interests of all
present and future citizens with dementia, as well as in the best
interests of all other adults suffering from severe cognitive
impairments, as part of their overall obligation as voters to act
in the best interests of all members of society as a whole. Voters,
in other words, represent all members of society, voters and nonvoters alike, and thus have an obligation to represent the best
interests of non-voters as well as voters when deciding how to
cast their ballots.
The clearest way to see this obligation is to consider the
policies that the current generation of voters adopts concerning
the use of natural resources and the protection of the
environment. Today's environmental laws affect not just a small
additional number of non-voters relative to the size of the
participating electorate. Instead, today's environmental laws
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affect all members of future generations, none of whom have a
say in the current electorate's determination regarding the use
and protection of natural resources. 22 If today's electorate
decides to exploit the Grand Canyon for its mineral deposits,
rather than preserve it as a place of unparalleled natural
beauty, that decision will affect every future member of society,
all of whom are unable to cast their own votes as part of making
this democratic decision. Assuming that the number of future
generations is far greater than today's electorate (an assumption
that is inevitable if one hopes that society lasts indefinitely into
the future), then with respect to this crucial question of
environmental policy the size of the governing group is far
smaller than the total size of those being governed. On this
issue, the current electorate is making an irrevocable decision
binding on all future citizens.
Given this unavoidable reality, the current electorate
should not see itself entitled to cast its ballots based solely on its
self-interest, without regard to equal consideration of the
interests of future generations. If current voters approach the
question "Should we exploit the available natural resource or
protect it for the future?" solely from the perspective of "What
policy is in my best interest?", the current generation will
excessively deplete natural resources to the detriment of future
generations. On this approach, the selfishness of the present will
deprive future generations of their fair share, or fair enjoyment,
of the same natural resources. 23
22 See, Dennis F. Thompson, Representing Future Generations: PoliticalPresentism
and Democratic Trusteeship, 13 CRITICAL REV. OF INT'L & POL. PHIL. 17 (2010).
Thompson's approach in this essay shares some strong affinities with my account here,
in terms of the need for democracy theory to develop a conception of trusteeship to
protect the interests of future generations. But Thompson's conception differs from mine
in its details insofar as he believes that the present owes to the future only the
protection of the democratic process itself. Rather, I maintain the present owes duties of
justice to the future, even if there can be reasonable disagreement on what those duties
of justice entail, thereby requiring democratic procedures to choose among those
reasonable conceptions.
23
One cannot assume that future generations will view the tradeoff between
environmental protection and exploitation of natural resources in the same way as the
current generation does. For example, the current generation might think that the
material benefits of carbon-fuel consumption is worth the cost in terms of air pollution
and global warming, whereas future generations might have preferred less air pollution
and global warming even at the cost of fewer material benefits. Thus, to be fair to future
generations, the current generations needs to do more than think of the well-being of the
future measured by current values, but also the capacity of the future to determine its
own well-being according to its own values.
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Instead, the current generation of voters should see
themselves obligated, as voters when choosing among competing
candidates, to act in the best interests of all members of society,
present and future. Society is an ongoing enterprise, and each
generation of citizens has an obligation to preserve and nurture
it so that it flourishes indefinitely into the future. 24 Society and
all its assets-its stock of natural resources as well as all the
extra value created by human manipulation of those natural
resources-is something that the current generation inherits
from the past and then, after taking a turn as custodian, passes
down to the future.
The old term "commonwealth," preserved in the official
names of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, nicely
captures this perspective. The full resources of the polity are its
wealth, held in common for the sake of its members, both
present and future. The current generation holds the
commonwealth in trust for the benefit of posterity. Thus, when
making decisions concerning the best use of the assets belonging
to the commonwealth, the current generation of citizens acts as
trustees, owing a fiduciary obligation to all citizens present and
future. 25 Each member of the current generation, as a voter,
shares in this fiduciary obligation. As a voter, each citizen is
supposed to consider and exercise conscientious judgment
concerning what would be in the best interests of all citizens,
whether alive today or at some point in the future. 26
The office of voter, in other words, is the office of a trustee.
Each voter is charged with the responsibility of acting on behalf
Nor can one assume that the current generation is naturally altruistic with
respect to the interests of its offspring. The share of national wealth devoted to Social
Security, compared to early childhood education, suggests that older generations are
willing to benefit themselves at the expense of younger generations. A similar point is
often made about the current generation saddling future generations with excessive
national debt.
24 See Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations
for the
Environment, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 198, 198-200 (1990).
25 See generally Thompson,
supranote 22.
26 My point here is to say that a person alive a
century from now has equal moral
worth as a person alive today. Therefore, that future person's interests regarding the
disposition of the commonwealth's resources deserve equal consideration to the
equivalent interests of the currently living person. To make this point, I do not need to
know whether any particular person will be alive a century from now. I only need to
assume, as I am entitled to do given the inherent human desirability of perpetuating
human existence, that some such persons will be alive one hundred years hence. For this
reason, I do not need to wrestle with the so-called "non-identity" problem that has vexed
philosophers. See Thompson, supra note 22, at 11-12.
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of society as a whole, present and future. Just as any other
trustee breaches his or her fiduciary duty when using the trust's
assets to promote the trustee's own personal self-interest, so too
voters breach their fiduciary duties to society as a whole,
present and future, if they exploit the electorate's power over the
assets of commonwealth to promote their own personal selfinterest.
III. THE ROLE OF THE TRUSTEE IN RAWLSIAN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY

Thus far, the argument for viewing voters as trustees of all
society, present and future, has proceeded intuitively, relying
primarily on environmental policy as an intuitively obvious area
in which voters must undertake this fiduciary responsibility. It
is possible, however, to present the idea more formally. To do so,
I shall invoke a version of John Rawls's justly famous
philosophy for the pursuit of a fair society.
In his first and most celebrated book, A Theory of Justice,
Rawls developed the idea of an original position to model the
concept of a fair social contract. 27 As initially conceived, this idea
of an original position imagined that all adult citizens of a
society were behind a veil of ignorance that deprived them of
knowing anything about their own personal characteristics.
They would not know their race, their gender, their family or
socio-economic circumstances, or even their talents or other
attributes. They would know only that they were each a citizen
of the society. Rawls reasoned that whatever social contract the
individuals behind this veil of ignorance would reach would be
an inherently fair one, since each individual was on an equal
footing behind the veil. 2 8

Although theoretically attractive, this conception of the
original position had its obvious difficulties. Since none of us
ever are, or can be, behind a veil of ignorance, it is impossible to
know exactly how we would deliberate about the terms of the
social contract if in that situation. 29 Given the artificiality of the
conception of persons in the original position, stripped as they

27
28
2

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE [hereinafter THEORY] (1971).
Id. at 102-68.
Michael Sandel has been a leading critic of Rawls on this point. See MICHAEL

SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 122-32 (1982).
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are of all personal identity, it is almost like imagining a group of
identical computers agreeing upon the terms of a social contract.
But a computer would not know what considerations are
important when making the bargain unless programmed in a
particular way, and thus whatever went into the program would
be determinative of the outcome. Why would we need the
computers at all if we knew what views about justice to program
them with? In this way, the idea of the original position seemed
circular or self-defeating.
It also had particular difficulty with the same problem of
future generations that makes questions of environmental policy
so tricky. How could members of future generations be parties to
the same social contract as members of the current generation?
It is one thing to imagine all members of the current generation
behind a veil of ignorance. It is quite another to imagine the
current generation, in ignorance, bargaining with a currently
nonexistent future generation. To do so stretched the
artificiality
of the imaginative
exercise
beyond the
30
point.
breaking
In a subsequent book, Justice as Fairness:A Restatement,
however, Rawls began to reconceive the idea of the original
position, using a different formulation. 31 The individuals in the
original position should be understood as "trustees" of actual
persons, although these trustees do not know any particular
details about the actual persons they are entrusted to represent.
Here is how Rawls described it: "The parties [to the social
contract in the original position], as representatives of free and
equal citizens, act as trustees or guardians. Thus, in agreeing to
principles of justice, they must secure the fundamental interests
of those they represent." 32

Rawls himself recognized this point. Accordingly, he opted for what he called
the
"present time entry interpretation" of the original position, meaning that the parties are
all members of the present generation. But this interpretation, in turn, led to the
difficulty that the present generation could favor itself over the future. See THEORY,
supra note 27, at 140. To deal with that problem, Rawls altered the psychology of the
parties to the original position by making them altruistically care for the welfare of
future generations, at least as far as their children and grandchildren are concerned. See
THEORY, supra note 27, at 128, 292.
30

31

JOHN RAwLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT [hereinafter JUSTICE AS

FAIRNESS] (1985).
32

Id. at 84.
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"In short," Rawls added, "the original position is to be
understood as a device of representation." 33 Each party in the
original position "is responsible for the fundamental interests of
a free and equal citizen" and must negotiate a fair social
contract on behalf of that citizen. The key point, however,
remained that the parties in the original position are not
permitted to "know the social position of the persons
they represent." 34
This new conception of the original position is easier to
comprehend, especially for attorneys who are trained to be able
to represent the interests of clients regardless of their clients'
particular circumstances. Thus, imagine the original position as
a convention of attorneys each of whom is charged with the
responsibility of negotiating the best agreement feasible on
behalf of a particular client, but the attorneys are deprived of
knowing any details about their clients other than the fact that
they are, or will be (if they are members of a future generation),
citizens of the society. The attorneys are all members of the
current generation of citizens, living in the here and now. They
have full knowledge of their own identities, as well as full
knowledge of their society's past. Thus, there is nothing artificial
about their capacity to deliberate and bargain on behalf of their
clients. They each use their training and skill, acting as a
fiduciary on behalf of their particular client, to strike the most
favorable deal they can. What counts as most favorable under
the circumstances, however, is constrained by the attorney not
knowing whether the particular client is a man or woman, black
or white (or of another race), rich or poor, lazy or industrious, or
indeed having any other personal characteristic.
This alternative conception of the original position also
mitigates the problem of future generations. To be sure, the
future remains inherently unknowable. But the idea of the
future is not inconceivable, nor the idea that there will be
citizens of society in the future. For this reason, the attorneys in
the original position, knowing their own identities in the here
and now, can be ignorant of whether their particular clients are
members of the current or instead a future generation. In this

" Id. at 18.
34 Id. Rawls also developed the idea of the parties in the original position as
trustees for citizens in POLITICAL LIBERALISM. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM

64, 75, 106, 225, 381, 413 [hereinafter POLITICAL LIBERALISM] (1993).
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way, in their bargaining today, the attorneys can represent
equally the interests of individuals living in either the present
or the future. 35 There is no awkward attempt to think of the
social contract as an agreement between present and future
generations of citizens. Indeed, under this alternative conception
of the original position, the citizens themselves are not the
parties to the social contract, whether those citizens are alive
now or in the future. Instead, it is the trustees, all alive here
and now, who negotiate and accept the terms of the social
contract on behalf of the unknown clients they are charged with
the responsibility of representing as best they can in this
condition of ignorance.
To be candid, Rawls does not go as far in developing this
alternative "trustee" model of the original position as I do. In
this respect, my approach is "Rawlsian" in spirit and derivation,
but not a rigid application of Rawls's views exclusively. In his
later words, Rawls continued to conceive of the trustees in the
original position as entirely "artificial" persons. 36 This
artificiality, however, I believe is both counterproductive, given
our inability to be confident about how artificial persons might
think (since they, by definition, do not exist), and unnecessary,
given our ability based on experience to consider how attorneys
trained in the professional responsibility of exercising fiduciary
duties on behalf of clients would actually think if told they had a
client but one whose identity remained anonymous.
Rawls also excessively limits the general knowledge of
history and social circumstances that the trustees in the original
position have about their society, although his later writings are
somewhat unclear on this point. Initially, in A Theory of Justice,
Rawls emphatically asserted that "the parties do not know the
particular circumstances of their own society .

.

. or the level of

civilization and culture it has been able to achieve." 37 Rawls did
3 The trustee conception is also an improvement on Rawls's admittedly rigged (and
sexist) motivational assumption, presented initially in A THEORY OF JUSTICE, that the
parties to the original position were present-day "heads of families" motivated by concern
for the well-being of the next two generations of their families. Concern for
grandchildren, but not for generations beyond them, might not be sufficient to protect
environmental resources adequately for all posterity. Conversely, an attorney charged
with the responsibility of representing the best interests of a citizen alive one hundred
years from now, or even one thousand, would be sure to secure a social contract that did
not prejudice the interests of posterity for the sake of the more immediate future.
36

See JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 31,
at 83.

37

THEORY, supra note 27, at 137.
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this in the hope that the principles of justice derived from the
original position would have a kind of transcendent,
universalistic status, applicable to all times and places (at least
for those societies with adequate resources for which social
justice among all members could be conceivable). But as Rawls
later developed his explicitly political conception of political
philosophy, meaning that it entailed no metaphysically
transcendent claims, he apparently relaxed these universalistic
assumptions and aspirations. 38 In Justice as Fairness: A
Restatement, Rawls speaks of the trustees knowing "the
presently accepted facts of social theory" and "the same
information about the general circumstances of society."39 In this
formulation, it is unclear how much of the particular history of
their own society the trustees are entitled to know. 40
In both his earlier and later work, Rawls distinguished
between the original position and an idealized constitutional
convention: although both would be governed by a veil of
ignorance, the extent of the veil would differ in the two
situations. While the veil would be complete for the original
position, blocking even general knowledge about one's own
society, the veil would be "partially lifted" for the idealized
constitutional convention, permitting knowledge of "the relevant
general facts about their society, that is, its natural
circumstances and resources, its level of economic advance and
political culture, and so on"-although the delegates to this
idealized constitutional convention still have "no information
about particular individuals .

.

. their place in the distribution of

natural attributes, or their conception of the good." 4 1
My account of the original position, in contrast, essentially
collapses this distinction between it and the idealized constitutional convention. As will become clearer later in this essay, the
trustees as I conceive of them can be considered delegates to an
ideal constitutional convention just as easily as they can be
considered negotiators of a fair social contract. The distinction
between the two alternative conceptions is not important

See POLITICAL

LIBERALISM, supra note 34.

" JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 31, at 87.
40 But cf. JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 31, at 101 (asserting that the trustees

"don't have the particular knowledge" that "[h]istory tells of more aristocracies and
theocracies, dictatorships and class-states, than democracies").
41
THEORY, supra note 27, at 197.
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because an ideal constitution for a society can be viewed as
equivalent to a fair social contract for the same society. The
trustees behind the veil of ignorance are supposed to hammer
out the fundamental terms by which governance of the society is
organized; these fundamental terms can be considered the social
contract or the ideal constitution. Whichever way does not
matter, especially for the topic of this essay: the procedural
rules, including election laws, which the trustees would choose
for the governance of the society. Those procedural rules would
be terms included within the ideal constitution for the society,
whether or not we would also consider them part of the fair
social contract for the society. Thus, if one prefers, one can take
my essay as applicable to Rawls's conception of an ideal
constitutional convention, rather than being applicable to his
theory of the original position, although I believe that the
trustee version of the veil of ignorance (as I have described it) is
the best account of both.
IV. DEMOCRACY AS A PROCEDURAL DEVICE FOR THE TRUSTEES
IN THE ORIGINAL POSITION

With the original position understood this way, what
provisions would the trustees adopt for the social contract to
govern the relations among their clients, those alive both now
and in the future? Particularly with respect to issues of
environmental policy, would the trustees adopt rules that permit
the exploitation of natural resources and, if so, on what terms, or
would the trustees set aside at least some natural treasures
(like the Grand Canyon) as permanently protected from any
physical impairment? To what extent would the trustees adopt a
system of private property to incentivize the efficient harnessing
of exploitable resources to socially optimal ends, and to what
extent would the trustees adopt a system of redistributive
taxation to offset wealth inequalities generated by a system of
private property and a free market economy?
Consideration of these and related questions among any
group of attorneys endeavoring to simulate the original position,
all bargaining on behalf of clients whose identities are unknown,
will lead sooner or later to the realization that the attorneys will
be unable to reach a consensus on what the terms of the social
contract should be. Some attorneys will advocate greater
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reliance on private property; others less so. Some will argue for
stricter protection of natural resources; others less SO. 4 2
These differences of opinion among the attorneys will not be
attributable to the attorneys advocating their own self-interests.
On the contrary, even when attempting in utmost good faith to
advocate on behalf of their anonymous clients, the attorneys will
diverge in their judgment about what is in the best interest of
the "average" or indeterminate citizen, present or future. 43
Perhaps these differences of opinion are attributable, to some
extent, to the differences in personality or temperament among
the attorneys themselves (even if not attributable to their
pursuit of self-interests). 44 Some attorney-trustees will be more

Even in his more recent writings, Rawls held out the hope that the trustees in
the original position would agree unanimously to the terms of a fair social contract. See
JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 31, at 86, 102. But as Jeremy Waldron (among others)
has shown, this quest for unanimity is unrealistic even under the constraints that Rawls
imposes for his idea of the original position. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT ch. 8, 9 (1999).
43 Rawls recognized that individuals motivated to make political judgments based
on a sense of justice, rather than self-interest, would disagree in good faith about the
best policies for society to adopt. See POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 34 at 58
("[M]any of our most important judgments are made under conditions where it is not to
be expected that conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after free
discussion, will all arrive at the same conclusion."). This recognition by Rawls comes
close to acknowledging that even the trustees in the original position inevitably would
have reasonable disagreements about what provisions to include in a fair social
contract. When we conceive of the trustees in the original positions as real flesh-andblood individuals ignorant only of the identity of the individuals they represent, goodfaith disagreement among the trustees is roughly equivalent to good-faith disagreement
among citizens motivated to act impartially rather than based on self-interest. One
potential difference that might narrow, but not eliminate, the range of good-faith
disagreement among the trustees in the original position as compared to ordinary
citizens deliberating in good faith is the special training the trustees might receive
concerning how to act as a fiduciary on behalf of a client. If law school is supposed to
enable attorneys to better represent the interests of individuals who may be different
from themselves in terms of social background, economic status, and the like, then it is
not inconceivable that the trustees would do a better job than ordinary citizens
converging upon principles of social justice that treat everyone fairly. But if there is
nothing particularly special about law school education in this regard, and instead high
school civics--if taught properly-could train all citizens in the capacity to assume the
role of trustees representing the interests of clients whose identity is unknown, then the
range of irreducible good-faith disagreement among the trustees in the original position
would be essentially the same as the range of good-faith disagreement among ordinary
citizens motivated to make political judgments impartially.
42

44

See POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 34, at 57 ("To some extent ...

the way we

assess evidence and weigh moral and political values is shaped by our total
and our total experiences must always differ. Thus, in a modern
experience ...
society . . . citizens' total experiences are disparate enough for their judgments to
diverge, at least to some degree, on many if not most cases of any significant
complexity."). Here, again, Rawls is speaking of ordinary citizens, rather than the parties
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optimistic about the prospects of future technology to
compensate for the depletion of resources in the present and
thus more willing to permit exploitation of resources at a faster
rate. Likewise, some attorney-trustees will judge that their
client's best interest is pursued by an economic system that
permits a substantial degree of economic inequality in order to
maximize the likelihood of greater overall wealth as a result,
even if conditions for worst-off members of society are inferior to
what they otherwise might be (recognizing the possibility that
the client might end up being one of the worst-off). Other
attorney-trustees, by contrast, would forego the prospects of
improvements for the rest of society in order to avoid inferior
circumstances for the worst-off (recognizing, nonetheless, the
likelihood the client would occupy a position in society other
than among the worst-off). But difference of opinion of this sort
among the attorney-trustees cannot be seen as a breach of
fiduciary duty on the part of any of them. Rather, it is in the
honest exercise
of their fiduciary duty that these
attorney-trustees come to their different opinions about what
the specific terms of a fair social contract would be for their
clients, all of whom remain behind the veil of ignorance.
What would the attorney-trustees in the original position do
once they recognized this good faith and reasonable
disagreement among themselves concerning the provisions of
the fair social contract for their clients? They soon would realize
the need to adopt the democratic principle of majority rule to
resolve all disagreements that remain among themselves after
exhausting the possibility of achieving consensus through
deliberation. Why majority rule? Because the attorney-trustees
would conceive of themselves as equally entitled to influence the
choice of the terms of the social contract. They would see
themselves as equals in this way in their role as trustees for two
important reasons. First, the interests of each of their clients are
entitled to equal consideration in the choice of the social
contract. According to the basic egalitarian premise shared by
utilitarian and Kantian moral philosophies (among many
others), each citizen counts for one, and only one, in the
formulation of the society's governing rules. Accordingly, as
in the original position, although the same point applies as long as the parties in the
original position are understood according to the trustee conception that I have
articulated.
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proxies for their clients' interests, the input of each trustee must
be given equal weight. Second, since each attorney-trustee
exercises independent fiduciary duty on behalf of each of his or
her client, each attorney-trustee must have an autonomous and
equal vote when it comes to the necessity of all the attorneytrustees voting on what provisions to adopt in the social
contract.
To be sure, as part of the deliberative process, some
attorney-trustees may come to be persuaded by the superior
reasoning and eloquence of other attorney-trustees. These
attorney-trustees, being flesh-and-blood humans living in the
real world and aware of the differences in aptitude among the
attorneys themselves, may come to defer to what they perceive
as the superior wisdom and analysis of some of their colleagues.
Even so, each attorney-trustee still has an equal vote. In
deciding how to vote on the terms of the social contract, each can
factor in the extent to which he or she has been persuaded, or
wishes to defer to, the reasoning of other attorney-trustees as
part of one's own fiduciary responsibility to exercise one's best
judgment on behalf of one's client. For instance, the best I might
be able to do for my client is to accept the persuasive argument
of a truly brilliant attorney-trustee who happens to be among us
in the original position. But in the end, each attorney-trustee
must make an independent judgment on what is in the client's
best interest, and that judgment is reflected in the equal vote
that each attorney-trustee has when it comes time to break
achieve
to
inability
an
by
caused
impasse
the
deliberative consensus.
In aggregating all the separate votes of the attorneytrustees, majority rule is the single fairest way to give equal
power to each of the votes. If some sort of supermajority rule is
required to break a deadlock among the attorney-trustees-say
a two-thirds requirement-the result will only be to give a
minority of the attorney-trustees blocking power. That means
more power for fewer trustees, or an unequal distribution of
power among the trustees themselves. Once committed to the
necessity of equality among trustees, in order to mirror the
equal moral worth of all the citizens they represent, the trustees
necessarily will gravitate to majority rule as the unique best
method to resolve any disagreements among themselves.
Thus, for themselves in the original position, the trustees
will create a regime of one-trustee-one-vote. They will do so not
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because they are entitled to advance their own self-interest as
trustees. On the contrary, as trustees they must always advance
the interests of their clients as best as they determine these
interests in the exercise of their fiduciary duties. Thus, in this
context the democratic principle of equal voting rights and
majority rule exist not to aggregate the multiple expressions of
of
exercises
multiple
the
rather
but
self-interest,
fiduciary duties.
V.

DEMOCRACY AS THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT THE TRUSTEES
WOULD ADOPT FOR SOCIETY

To say that the trustees would adopt democratic procedures
for themselves, to resolve disagreements among themselves on
what provisions the social contract should contain, is not the
same as saying that the trustees would adopt democracy as the
form of government for the society itself, by which their clients
will be governed. To be sure, democracy as their own procedure
may incline, or orient, the trustees towards some form of
democracy as the procedural device for the operation of the
actual government of society. Insofar as they anticipate creating
a legislature for the enactment of society's laws (as we shall
elaborate below), they can envision giving each member of the
legislature one vote, just as each of the trustees themselves has
one vote in their own deliberations. But adopting a rule of onelegislator-one-vote for parliamentary deliberations does not
necessarily entail adopting anything like one-person-one-vote for
determining participation in electing the legislators. The
argument that virtually all adult citizens should have equal
voting rights in legislative elections will need to be more
complicated, involving an understanding of how trustees
transition from the original position in which they set the terms
of the social contract to the actual operation of the government
of society pursuant to the terms of that social contract.
As we begin to explore that transition, we should first
observe that when the trustees create the legislature as a core
part of the government of society, they do so knowing that it
necessarily will exercise government power as one among
several institutions of government. There will also be courts
exercising judicial power and executive officials implementing
legislation. The exact relationship of these different institutions
of government will be something for the trustees to consider. For
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example, is it better to create three co-equal branches of
government, or instead make the judiciary and executive
subservient to parliamentary supremacy? However the trustees
choose to answer this question, merely raising it forces the
recognition that considering whether to adopt democratic voting
procedures for the government of society is different from
considering whether to adopt democratic voting procedures for
deliberations among the trustees themselves. Along with
choosing rules concerning who can vote for members of the
legislature, the trustees will also be determining the scope of the
legislature's powers and its relationship to the other branches of
government. Thus, we can see the possibility that the trustees,
when establishing the government of society, would deviate from
a simple model of parliamentary democracy in multiple ways. 4 5
A.

The Protection of Fundamental Rights from Even
Democratic Governments

First, the trustees may be tempted to fix in the social
contract itself certain inalienable rights, which no part of the
government, including the legislature, would be entitled to
breach. These rights would be fundamental and antecedent to
the operation of government. Of course, the trustees might need
to specify some sort of social institution that would be
empowered to identify and remedy breaches of these
fundamental, pre-political rights, and that institution might be
considered to be itself a branch of government, exercising a form
of government power. But the nature of that institution, the way
its members are to be selected, and the procedures by which it

1 It is also conceivable that, rather than establishing a single legislature, with
responsibility to enact law in all domains of public policy, the trustees would create
multiple special-purpose legislatures, each one for a different public policy domain. For
example, there could be one legislature for environmental regulation, another for health
care regulation, a third for taxation, and so forth. In this scheme, specialized legislatures
would function much as specialized administrative agencies do in the United States
today. There would need to be some institution, perhaps a court, empowered to
adjudicate any jurisdictional conflict arising among more than one of these specialized
legislatures. On an ongoing basis, citizens--or their trustees, if reconvening to assess the
merits of the system they had established originally-would need to make judgments
about the capacity of the specialized legislatures to handle all the issues of public policy
that government might need to address. For example, what if a new technology arose,
like the internet, which did not seem to be within the jurisdiction of any existing
specialized legislature? There would need to be a mechanism to assign the new technology to one of the existing legislatures, or else to create a new one for the regulation of
the new technology.
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operates, might be very different from the rest of the
governmental system that the trustees adopt for the formation
of the legislative and administrative processes of the society. 46
Set apart from the rest of government in this way-and
limited to protection of the fundamental, pre-political rightsthis distinctive institution might be viewed as not really part of
the political governance of society, serving an altogether
different function than the enactment and implementation of
legislative and administrative policies. If the members of this
institution were some sort of political elite, appointed because of
perceived expertise or wisdom rather than democratically
elected and accountable, the undemocratic character of this
distinctive institution would not prejudge whether or not the
trustees separately would choose democratic procedures for the
core legislative and administrative components of the society's
government. 47 The idea of a specialized constitutional court,
empowered to enforce a fundamental-indeed even inalienable-Bill of Rights, which no government is entitled to abridge,
would be a specific conception of this type of specialized social
institution. The extent to which appointing members of the
constitutional court might be considered undemocratic, because
these members are unelected and unaccountable and are
selected based on elitist criteria of superior expertise and
wisdom, would not negate the possibility that the rest of
society's government, including its legislative and executive
branches, could be thoroughly democratic in character.
It is an interesting question whether the trustees, by
majority vote, would choose to include in the social contract the
specification of some fundamental and inalienable rights, which
no government would be entitled to abridge and thus would
require the protection of some institution other than the
ordinary government. Worthwhile arguments can be made for
either outcome, and we need not resolve them here. 48 Even if

See generally Jeremy Waldron, Essay, The Core of the Case Against Judicial
Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) (noting that courts, including those in charge of the
enforcement of individual rights, "are mostly not elective or representative
institutions . . . [and] the judiciary is not permeated with an ethos of elections,
representation, and electoral accountability in the way that the legislature is.").
47 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial
Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (2008) (arguing that judicial review of legislation does
not meaningfully diminish democratic legitimacy).
4
See generally Fallon, supra note 47; Waldron, supra note
46.
46
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some sort of pre-political Bill of Rights is essential to a fair
social contract, or at least a majority of trustees would so
determine, it is obviously the case that not all issues of social
policy would be predetermined in advance in the social contract
itself. Instead, on many questions-including many issues of
environmental policy-the trustees would recognize that the
government of society would need to adopt and revise legislation
and administrative practices on an ongoing basis. The social
contract would not set a specific level of acceptable air or water
pollution. The social contract would not specify a fixed rate for
the depletion of known oil reserves. Instead, the trustees would
recognize that society would need ongoing procedures of
government by which to address these recurring questions of
social policy. Thus, the task of the trustees would be to establish
in the social contract a fair set of government procedures by
which these issues of social policy could be regularly addressed,
rather than fixing a definite policy on each of these environmental issues within the social contract itself.4 9

B.

Who Should Elect the Legislature?

The question remains whether the trustees would choose
democratic procedures for the legislative and administrative
institutions of government empowered to adopt and implement,
on a regular basis, the environmental policies (as well as other
ordinary social policies) for the society. Although the trustees
would choose democratic procedures for themselves, in order to
settle an disagreement among themselves upon which provisions
to include in the social contract-including provisions
concerning the procedures for the legislative and administrative
institutions of society-can we be confident that they would
write into the social contract the same sort of democratic
procedures that they use for their own deliberations? We must
at least consider the possibility that, in sincerely considering the
best interests of their clients, the trustee might be open to
legislative and
adopting some sort of nondemocratic
administrative processes for the operation of the society's
government.5 0 We have seen that the trustees would be willing
49 See POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 34 at 133-40 (exploring how a
constitutional regime could be legitimate despite the pluralistic, conflicting views of its
citizens).
'o Rawls himself considered this possibility in A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 27,
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to consider some sort of nondemocratic, elitist institution for the
protection of fundamental pre-political rights. Given this, would
they not at least be willing to consider arguments that it would
be in the best interest of their clients to have the social contract
specify that the legislative power of society should reside in an
institution whose members, rather than been selected through a
mechanism of universal suffrage, would be selected by some
other method?
Given their ignorance of their client's identity, the trustees
would need to consider both (a) the risk that their clients would
be disenfranchised under any regime that granted less than
universal suffrage, an obvious serious concern given the
attorneys' fiduciary obligation to protect the clients' interests,
and (b) the possibility that a regime with less than universal
suffrage might produce social policies-superior economic
growth, superior environmental protection, more equitable
distribution of resources, and the like-that better advance the
clients' well-being than a regime of universal suffrage. The
question, considered solely from the perspective of the fiduciary
obligation to the unidentified client, is whether or not universal
suffrage would be in the client's best interest, when compared to
any other alternative that might be proposed for the trustees'
consideration. Thus, we need to confront the theoretical
possibility that the trustees, in exercising their fiduciary duty,
might be tempted to deviate from democracy in this second, and
ultimately more significant, way-by deciding (even though the
trustees themselves vote democratically) to establish in the
social
contract
a
legislature
that
itself
is
not
chosen democratically.
Having considered this possibility, however, I now wish to
show why the trustees would reject an undemocratic legislature.
Instead, after deliberation, the trustees decisively (even if not
necessarily unanimously) would believe that the interests of
their clients are best served by a legislature elected in
accordance with the principle of universal suffrage, one-personone-vote, or at least as universal as practicable given the
inevitable mental incapacity of some adult citizens. In other
words, the trustees ultimately would extend democracy to the
operation of the society's legislative processes, including the
at 232, when he discussed John Stuart Mill's defense, from egalitarian premises, of
giving extra voting rights to "persons with greater intelligence and education."
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election of the legislature's members and the use of referenda
and other instruments of direct democracy for the purposes of
having the citizenry exercise the legislative power directly.
Understanding why the trustees would make this choice
requires consideration of the charge that the trustees would give
the legislature in the governance of society and the judgment
that they trustees would make on how the legislature most
likely would best fulfill that charge.
First and foremost, the trustees would stipulate that the
legislature would be required to exercise the same fiduciary
responsibility on behalf of all citizens, present and future, that
the trustees themselves must exercise.5 1 The legislature exists
because the trustees themselves cannot specify all the laws in
the social contract itself. The trustees must create the
legislature so that, on an ongoing basis, the society itself can
adjust the rules regulating environmental protection and other
policy issues confronting the commonwealth. In this respect (as
mentioned at the end of Part III, above), we can consider the
trustees in the original position akin to an idealized
constitutional convention, and the social contract that they
would adopt on behalf of their clients an idealized constitution
for the society. The constitution might specify some paramount
rules and principles to be enforced by a constitutional court (or
some comparable institution), but the constitution's primary
function would be the specification of the legislative powers for
the regular government of the society. 52 But in making this
specification, the trustees would insist that the members of the
legislature stand in the same relationship to the citizenry of
society, present and future, as the trustees themselves do: as

51 To clarify, we can envision the members of the legislature imaging themselves as
if they were these trustees (although no longer in the original position, but instead in the
here and now). In other words, when asking themselves what laws to adopt, the
legislators can consider themselves trustees of individuals, present or future, whose
identities they do not know. This, indeed, is the best way for the legislators to model
their duty to act in the public interest when considering what legislation to enact. Thus,
on this Rawlsian account, when speaking of the legislators as acting "impartially" or "in
the public interest," that terminology is shorthand for saying that the legislators view
themselves as fiduciaries for individuals whose specific identities they do not know,
including whether the particular individuals are alive today or in the distant future.
52 On this point, compare Rawls's own discussion of the four-stage sequence-(1)
original position, (2) constitutional convention, (3) legislation, (4) administration and
adjudication-which he developed in both A THEORY OF JUSTICE and subsequent work.
See THEORY, supra note 27, at 195-201; POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 34, at 39799. See also note 33, supra.
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fiduciaries, required to act in the best interests of all
such citizens. 53
How then to select the members of this legislature, so that
they most likely would act in accordance with this fiduciary
obligation and be the best fiduciaries possible? In making this
determination, the trustees would be aware of what in history
has caused legislators to fall short of acting as optimal
fiduciaries. The biggest risk that the trustees would perceive is
for legislators to serve the interests of only a portion of society,
rather than serving society as a whole. If the legislators come
only from an aristocratic class, they will tend to serve only the
interests of the aristocracy, even if they sincerely believe that
they are serving the interests of society as a whole impartially.54
The best way to counteract this tendency is to have the
legislators selected from as broad an electorate as feasible. For
example, permitting only an educated elite to select the
members of the legislature, or even just giving an educated elite
extra votes or weighing their votes more heavily (as some, like
John Stuart Mill, have contemplated), will only cause the
legislature to be skewed in favor of the interests of the educated
elite, rather than the legislature equally weighing the interests
of all.55 It is remarkable, for example, how the educated elite can

rationalize disproportionate government expenditures for
programs from which the educated elite disproportionately will
benefit, like taxpayer subsidies for opera. If the educated and
uneducated participate equally in the election of the legislature,
then the legislature less likely will be inadvertently biased in
favoring the interests of the educated or the interests of
the uneducated.56
Based on this argument so far, one might think that the
trustees would permit, even encourage, voters to follow their
own self-interests when electing members of the legislature. The
uneducated would be free to counteract the educated. But that
interpretation would be incorrect. Rather, given the fiduciary
function the legislators are supposed to serve, the voters are

1s For an extended discussion of legislators as fiduciaries, see generally D. Theodore
Rave, Politiciansas Fiduciaries,126 HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013).
5

See POLITICAL EQUALITY, supra note 11.

In A THEORY OF JUSTICE, Rawls himself discusses, and refuses to condemn, Mill's
view on this point. See THEORY, supra note 27, at 223.
5

56

See POLITICAL EQUALITY, supra note 11.
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supposed to ask themselves, "Which of the competing candidates
would better fulfill the fiduciary role?" The voters are not
supposed to ask themselves, "Which candidate would better
serve my personal self-interest, or the self-interests of my
family, clan, or class?" The fact that human nature indicates an
inevitable tendency of voters, and legislators, to make political
decisions based on self-interest does not alter the normative
point that voters, and legislators, should strive to serve the
broader public interest, and that well-designed political
institutions can be structured to make it more likely to achieve
this normative goal.
The point, then, is that by empowering all mentally
competent adult citizens to ask the question, "Which candidate
would be a better fiduciary on behalf of all citizens, present and
future?," there is a better chance of electing legislators more
capable of exercising this fiduciary responsibility successfully
than if only a subset of the mentally competent adult citizens
are permitted to participate in the election of the legislators.
One can think of this point as "crowdsourcing," the task of
identifying the most promising of candidates to exercise the
fiduciary responsibility of serving as a legislator.51 The alumni of
Harvard College might do a decent job of picking fiduciaries to
serve as lawmakers for society. But the alumni of all the
nation's high schools would do an even a better job in the
selection of the lawmaking fiduciaries, because they would draw
upon their full array of backgrounds and perspectives when
deciding which candidates would most likely best serve the
public interest as a whole, both now and into the future.
By extending in this way the power to pick the fiduciary
legislators, the principle of universal suffrage draws upon the
common sense of the commonwealth. It is similar to the
judgment that juries perform best when drawn from the full
body of the public. Government undoubtedly requires the
consideration of scientific expertise when addressing issues of
environmental protection, health care, and a wide range of
public policy issues. The capacity to address those issues
successfully is undoubtedly aided by education. Thus, the

"

Cass

Sunstein, for

one, has written

extensively

on the

advantages

of

crowdsourcing. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE
KNOWLEDGE (2006) [hereinafter INFOTOPIA]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER:
GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO MAKING GROUPS SMARTER (2014) [hereinafter WISER].
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legislators themselves presumably will need education, whether
on-the-job training or otherwise, in order to exercise their
fiduciary responsibilities intelligently. And they will need to
hear the testimony of society's scientific experts before enacting
laws aimed to serve the long-term interests of society. Still, at
bottom, the selection of the legislators themselves will work best
if refracted through the lens of common sense. "Is this candidate
better suited to serve the common good of society?" On this
question, which is the crucial one for determining who should be
entitled to participate in the election of the legislature, society is
better served in the long run if all mentally competent adult
citizens get to participate equally in the answering of it.
By now, we should see from the development of the
argument that bias in the legislature is avoided, not by
encouraging voters to vote their own biases so that these biases
counteract each other, but instead by giving all voters an equal
chance to participate in the judgment of which candidates will
best serve society as a whole. The voters themselves may
inevitably, even unintentionally, let their own biases creep into
their judgments of which candidates would make the best
fiduciaries,
just as
the legislators
themselves
may
unintentionally let their own biases in when attempting
sincerely to exercise their fiduciary duty to all society as best
they can. But inadvertent bias, either at the level of the voter or
the legislator, is not a reason to give either participant in the
lawmaking process a license to willfully impose their own selfinterest on the formation of society's laws. Instead, it is a reason
to redouble the effort to make the performance of the
government function to serve the public interest as faithfully
and as optimally as possible, and this is true at the level of the
voter as well as the level of the lawmaker. The best way to
maximize the likelihood that voters will act in the overall public
interest when electing members of the legislature is, again, to
"crowdsource" this function, so that any biases that
inadvertently creep into the process tend to cancel each
other out.5 8

58 See INFOTOPIA, supra note 57, at 25-28 (outlining the Condorcet Jury Theorem).
Crowdsourcing, here, refers specifically to the idea that errors of judgment will be
reduced by increasing the number of individuals who collectively participate in the
exercise of the judgment. In this specific context, the crowdsourcing argument is
premised on the notion that errors of judgment caused by self-interest are reduced by
minimizing the degree to which any single individual's self-interest might affect the
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One might raise the following quibble: while the argument
shows that the legislators themselves are fiduciaries, and
further shows that the voters should strive to select the best
fiduciaries, it has not yet established that the voters themselves
are fiduciaries when selecting the legislators. I think this
quibble, however, misses the point about the relationship of the
voters and the legislators they elect. From the perspective of the
trustees in the original position, as they exercise their fiduciary
duties to all citizens present and future, they see both the voters
and the legislators as two components of the overall government
designed to implement the fair social contract on a regular,
ongoing basis-with the government having the same fiduciary
responsibility to the society as a whole that the trustees
themselves do. The government, in other words, stands in the
shoes of the trustees themselves insofar as the trustees cannot
undertake all the decisions of government at the time of
negotiating the terms of the social contract. If the trustees could
do that, they would; but since they cannot, they delegate the
implementation of their own fiduciary duties to the operation of
the government pursuant to the procedures specified in the fair
social contract.
From this perspective, it is not just the members of the
legislature who have been delegated a significant portion of the
trustees' fiduciaries duties. It is also the voters who elect the
members of the legislature who have been delegated another
portion of the trustees' fiduciary duties-the portion that the
trustees would exercise if they were electing the members of the
legislature. One way to think of this is to suppose, just for a
moment, that the trustees contemplated confining the electorate
to a much narrower group than all mentally competent adult
citizens. Suppose, in other words, that the trustees seriously
contemplated limiting the electorate to only those citizens who
graduated with a bachelor's degree from an accredited liberal
arts college or university. If the trustees were to do this, they
would not be empowering this group of college graduates to
consider solely their own personal self-interest when deciding
which legislators to elect. Instead, the trustees would be

collective decision. The argument, however, depends on the participating individuals
being adequately educated to engage in the collective judgment, so that the reduction in
bias that they contributed is not outweighed by excessive inclusion of ignorance. This
point about adequate education is pursued further in the next part of this essay.
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charging this group of college graduates with the fiduciary
responsibility of endeavoring in the best interest of the society
as a whole, now and into the future, to select the individuals
who will make the best legislators for the commonwealth's longterm welfare. Consequently, when the trustees decide to expand
the electorate to include all mentally competent adults, and not
just college graduates, the trustees are imposing this same
fiduciary duty on this expanded electorate. The trustees are
doing so based on their belief that the expanded electorate will
do a better job exercising this particular delegated fiduciary
duty than the more confined electorate. By expanding the
electorate, the trustees emphatically are not absolving the
electorate of its fiduciary obligation to choose legislators based
on a considered judgment of which candidate most likely will
best serve the public interest as a lawmaker.
In the eyes of the trustees, then, the voters they empower to
elect the legislature are fiduciaries, just as are the members of
the legislature. The voters obviously are fiduciaries insofar as, in
the context of referenda and other ballot measures, they
function directly as legislators. But the voters also are
fiduciaries when they exercise their more ordinary role of
selecting members of the legislature. They are fiduciaries in this
capacity because, in exercising this particular function, they are
acting on behalf of the trustees who have empowered them with
this responsibility and, indeed, have delegated to them this
particular portion of the trustees' own fiduciary responsibility to
act on behalf of society as a whole.
VI. A HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA AS A PREREQUISITE TO VOTE?

Even if the trustees in the original position would not limit
the electorate to college graduates, why would they not limit the
electorate to high school graduates, so long as each mentally
competent citizen has a full and fair opportunity to receive a
high school education? "We will guarantee every citizen a full
and fair opportunity to complete high school, but in exchange we
will require every citizen to take advantage of that opportunity
in order to participate in the fiduciary responsibility of electing
the legislators of society." Would that quid pro quo be one that
the trustees would write into the social contract?
In theory, we cannot rule out the idea entirely. Some
trustees might be inclined to contemplate it as a reasonable
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balance between the advantage of crowdsourcing the fiduciary
responsibility of selecting the legislators and the value of
assuring that members of the electorate have some degree of
education concerning the responsibilities to the public interest
they have when undertaking this election of the legislature.
Given the opportunity of everyone to attain a high school
education, some trustees might see an electorate of high school
graduates as broad enough to avoid implicit socioeconomic
biases, while at the same time fostering the expectation that the
electorate acts not on behalf of their own personal interests, but
instead on behalf of society as a whole, both now and into the
future.
But it seems far more likely that most trustees would rule
out this quid pro quo, even if they would be willing to guarantee
the opportunity to complete a high school education as part of
the social contract.5 9 The trustees would know that the
attainment of a high school diploma is far from universal.
Instead, only about three-quarters of citizens complete high
school, and in some segments of society the percentage is even
lower.6 0 Even worse, high school graduation rates vary by race,
with a significantly lower percentage of blacks completing high
school than whites. 6 1 The reasons for this are varied and
complicated, including inferior quality of high schools available
to black students as well as increased economic pressure on lowincome blacks to quit school in order to find means of financial
support. Whatever the reasons, however, if having a high school
diploma were a prerequisite to being a voter, the electorate
would be disproportionately skewed on the basis of race,
creating a significant risk that the electorate would have an
inadvertently implicit racial bias when undertaking its fiduciary
responsibility of selecting members of the legislature. 62 The
trustees, impartial and responsible for the well-being of all

59 See KEYSSAR, supra note 5, at114-18 (describing historical abuse of literacy tests
and other educational requirements as bases for restricting the franchise).
Public High School Graduation Rates, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION
6
STATISTICS (May 2014), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicatorcoi.asp,
archived at http://perma.cc/STS2-2WXG.
61
62

Id.

See Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND.
L.J. 1289, 1345-51 (2011) (discussing discriminatory effects of educational requirements
and civics test).
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members of society, would want to rule out this risk of implicit
racial basis.
For similar reasons, the trustees would reject literacy tests
and other measures purportedly designed to produce a more
competent electorate. They would have full knowledge of the
way in which literacy tests and similar devices have been used
historically to discriminate on the basis of race with respect to
the opportunity to participate in the election of lawmakers. 63
Charged with the responsibility of protecting the interests of all,
the trustees would want to write into the social contract strong
guarantees to prohibit any form of racial discrimination with
respect to voting. In this respect, the trustees would insist upon
robust protection of voting rights, of the kind embodied in the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.
But the protection of voting rights by the trustees would not
be for the purposes of enabling voters to pursue their own selfinterests. Rather, it would be to ensure the equal opportunity of
all citizens, regardless of race, to exercise the fiduciary
responsibility of serving as an elector. Just as the trustees would
write into the social contract prohibitions on racial
discrimination with respect to military or jury service, so too
would they include a prohibition on racial discrimination with
respect to electoral service. But none of these forms of
government service would entitle citizens to pursue self-interest
instead of the public interest. Thus, we can see that the
conception of voting as a fiduciary responsibility, derived from a
Rawlsian theory of a fair social contract, is entirely consistent
with a strong commitment to voting rights understood as
protecting the equal opportunity of all citizens, regardless of
race or other social circumstance, to perform this important form
of public service.
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF VIEWING VOTERS AS FIDUCIARIES

What follows from this Rawlsian conception of voters as
fiduciaries? In particular, what changes would there be to the
laws and procedures for regulating the process of voting, and
what effect would adopting this perspective have on the so-

63

See KEYSSAR, supra note 59, at 114-18.
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called "voting wars" that have afflicted our own society for the
last decade? 64
A.

Voting Rules and Procedures

The answer, in part, is that there would not be a radically
wholesale shift in voting rights jurisprudence. Precisely because
(for the reasons just stated) the Rawlsian perspective embraces
a strong commitment to voting rights, including a robust
prohibition on racial discrimination with respect to voting, the
Rawlsian perspective would not tolerate measures designed to
discourage the electoral participation of racial minorities. Thus,
insofar as it could be shown that voter identification laws, or
other voting rules, were adopted for the racially discriminatory
purpose of making it more difficult for minority citizens to vote,
then these laws should be vociferously condemned as violations
of a fair social contract.6 5

Still, adopting the Rawlsian perspective would have some
implications. For one thing, there would be less concern about
maximizing voter turnout, as long as all citizens (regardless of
race or other social circumstances) have equal and ample
opportunities to cast a ballot. A citizen must have an equal and
fair opportunity to participate in the fiduciary responsibility of
electing society's lawmakers. But if a citizen chooses not to take
advantage of this opportunity and thus not to participate in this
fiduciary responsibility, then the task will be performed by those
who choose to do so. This fiduciary responsibility is important
and not to be undertaken lightly. If some citizens decide that
they cannot be bothered to participate, then the fiduciary duty
will be better performed by those who take the responsibility
seriously. Unless one adopts the idea of compulsory voting, so
that everyone must serve, then citizens are entitled to opt out of
the obligation. 66 From a Rawlsian perspective, society does not

"

See generally RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE

.

NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012); Richard L. Hasen, Essay, The 2012 Voting Wars,
JudicialBackstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865
(2013).
6 Richard L. Hasen, Essay, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About
Republican Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127
HARV. L. REV. F. 58 (2014).
6 Australia has compulsory voting, and although it has been advocated for adoption
here, it is unlikely to take hold. Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2135, 2138 (1996) ("Enactment of a compulsory voting law in the United States . .

186

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2015

need every citizen to participate in the service of selecting the
lawmakers. Rather, society needs those who choose to
participate to do so from the perspective of endeavoring to elect
lawmakers most likely to act in the public interest, and society
needs that there be no barriers to participation in this form of
public service.6 7
Similarly, adoption of the Rawlsian perspective would cause
some adjustment of the trend towards so-called "convenience
voting," including no-excuse absentee voting.68 The Rawlsian
perspective certainly does not want voting to be inconvenient or

is unlikely to occur because of a widely held libertarian belief against government
interference in the decision to vote.").
67 Jason Brennan shares the view that voters should
attempt to promote the
common good, rather than their own self-interest, when they cast their ballots. But
Brennan goes further to claim that citizens have a moral duty to refrain from voting if
they are unwilling or unable to undertake the effort to become well-informed voters,
since their mistaken views about what the common good requires might inflict serious
harm on members of society-and thus would be contrary to the public interest that
voters are supposed to promote. See JASON BRENNAN, THE ETHICS OF VOTING (2011). In

my conception of voters-as-fiduciaries, I make no such claim about the obligation of
citizens to refrain from voting. Rather, I am inclined to believe that citizens should feel
entitled to participate as long as they are willing to do so in good faith, on behalf of their
sincere view of the public interest. They should not feel pressured to abstain if they have
not gone to considerable lengths to inform themselves about issues on the public agenda.
Rather, as long as they have given some consideration to the different positions of
opposing candidates and parties, they are entitled to assert their point of view about
which side is more likely to produce policies that serve the public good. My point about
voter turnout, which does not go nearly as far as Brennan's, is only that it need not be
considered a moral wrong if citizens decide for themselves not to cast a ballot because
they do not desire to participate in this fiduciary function of citizenship. In other words,
rather than having a duty to refrain from voting (as Brennan would claim), or a duty to
vote despite no desire to do so (as many others would argue), my Rawlsian account would
remain neutral in this regard-as long as citizens, when they decide to vote, do so with a
willingness to exercise this fiduciary function of citizenship to the best of their ability in
good faith.
In stating the point this way, I may be underestimating the "crowdsourcing" value
of citizens participating in the election of legislators even if these citizens have no desire
to do so. (I am grateful to Eli Poupko for bringing this point to my attention.) If the
electorate's decisions on average will more likely promote the public good as the
electorate grows in size, that "crowdsourcing" point would argue in favor of all citizens
feeling a moral obligation to cast a ballot even if they otherwise would be disinclined to
do so. As against this valid point, however, is the kind of counterargument that Brennan
might make: if voters are not sufficiently motivated to do a good job in exercising their
fiduciary duty to cast their ballot in the public interest as best they can, then their
suboptimal participation will tend to negate the crowdsourcing conception, at least at the
margin. I am inclined to let these counterarguments cancel each other out, leaving the
ordinary citizen neither morally obligated to participate when disinclined to do so nor
morally obligated to refrain unless willing to undertake extensive efforts to become wellinformed.
6 See generally Steven Huefner, Lessons from Improvements in Military and
Overseas Voting, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 833 (2013).
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for there to be unnecessary obstacles to participation. But the
Rawlsian perspective is dubious about the increasingly
prevalent consumer model of voting, pursuant to which voters
are to be treated as customers who deserve to have a positive
voting experience comparable to the kind of positive shopping
experience that a Wal-Mart or even Amazon might provide
them. Voters, unlike shoppers, should not be "in it" for
themselves. The goal is not to maximize their own utility.
Rather, the experience of being a voter should be welldesigned to the purpose of voting, which is the exercise of the
fiduciary responsibility of selecting society's lawmakers. While
that experience should not be hampered by features that make
it more difficult for voters to perform this public service, the
voting experience need not be designed with the goal of doing
everything to make it as easy as possible. For example, from the
perspective of voters as consumers the number of days devoted
to so-called early voting would be extended as long as doing so
was cost-effective given the government's fiscal budget. But from
the Rawlsian perspective, the number of days of early voting
might be limited to only a couple of weeks if it could be shown
that making the period longer was counterproductive in terms of
having voters do their best in exercising their fiduciary duty of
electing lawmakers (as might be the case, for example, if voters
in the earliest days of early voting had inferior information
concerning the candidates on the ballot). 69
Evenwel and the Determination of One-Person-One-Vote

B.

There is one major issue of contemporary election law for
which it makes a crucial difference whether one embraces the
Rawlsian conception of voters as fiduciaries or, instead, accepts
the view that voters are just self-interested consumers who
maximize the benefits they can obtain through the casting of
their ballots. This important issue is the one now pending before
the U.S. Supreme Court in Evenwel v. Abbott.70 The issue is
whether, for the purpose of the one-person-one-vote doctrine of

69

See generally JOHN C.

FORTIER, ABSENTEE

AND

EARLY VOTING:

TRENDS,

PROMISES, AND PERILS (2006).
7o See Evenwel v. Abbott, appeal docketed, No. 14-940 (U.S. May 26, 2014). The
Scotusblog page for the case contains the jurisdictional-stage briefs, available here:
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/evenwel-v-abbot/.
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Reynolds v. Sims,"7

population equality is to be determined
based on the total population of each legislative district, or
instead based on the number of eligible voters in each district.
If democracy is just a procedure for aggregating the
preferences of self-interested voter-consumers, then it is easy to
see why the logic of one-person-one-vote would require
equalizing the number of eligible voters in each legislative
district. This logic would be based on the premise that each
voter is equally entitled to have his or her own preferences count
the same in the computation of the social calculus, and thus the
only way to achieve this equally weighted vote is legislative
districts with the same number of voters.
But if alternatively one adopts the Rawlsian conception of
democracy, then one quickly see why legislative districting
should aim for equality of total population in each district,
rather than equal numbers of eligible voters. Under the
Rawlsian conception of voters as trustees for the interests of all
people in the polity, voters-like the legislators they elect-are
representatives of the people as a whole. All the people of the
territory, at least all those legally entitled to reside there
(including non-citizens who may become eligible for citizenship
in the future), are the ones whose interests are entitled to equal
consideration in the formation of the public policy for the
polity. 72 Given this need to treat the interests of all lawful
residents equally, the legislative mapmakers should seek equal
number of persons in each district, without regard to whether
doing so also equalizes the number of eligible voters in each
district. From this Rawlsian perspective, the voters in each
district (however many there may be) should cast their ballots
with the goal of serving the interests of all the people of their
district, indeed all the people of the polity as a whole. There is
no need, on this Rawlsian account, to make sure that each voter
has an equal chance of having his or her self-interested
preferences prevail. Instead, viewing the electorate as a large
assembly of fiduciaries acting on behalf of the public as a whole,
the relevant question is whether each member of the public is

n 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
72 1 set aside the issue of illegal aliens, who even
on a Rawlsian account might (or
might not) be excluded from calculating the equality of population in each legislative
district. The status of illegal aliens under Rawlsian theory is a topic beyond the scope of
this paper, requiring separate attention.
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receiving equal treatment in the drawing of legislative districts.
Once this districting determination is made, then each eligible
voter has an equal opportunity to exercise this fiduciary function
on behalf of the public at large. 73
One might argue that the Rawlsian conception of democracy
should be seen as sufficiently compelling to be incorporated into
the one-person-one-vote doctrine of Reynolds v. Sims. On this
jurisprudential view, all fifty states would be constitutionally
obligated to draw their legislative districts based on equality of
total population. They would not be permitted to adopt the
alternative "consumer" approach of equalizing the power of each
voter to pursue self-interest through the casting of ballots.
This jurisprudential view does not simply entail a belief in
the Rawlsian conception of democracy. It also entails a belief
about the propriety of constitutionalizing that conception of
democracy as an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. The merits of that interpretive belief
might be challenged by those who espouse judicial restraint as
the primary objective of constitutional adjudication. 4 This
essay, confining itself to a defense of the Rawlsian conception of
democracy as a matter of normative theory, does not take a
position on the separate jurisprudential matter of whether the
Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,
should be guided by judicial restraint or instead feel entitled to
constitutionalize its normative judgment concerning the best
conception of democracy. But even if the principle of judicial
restraint should prevail in Evenwel, that conclusion would mean
that the Court should not constitutionalize the "consumer"

' Recall that each voter gets one vote, regardless of the number of residents in the
voter's district. If some voters received two votes, while others one, that would violate
the principle of each fiduciary receiving an equal vote when the fiduciaries gather to
exercise collectively their fiduciary duties. (We saw the principle of one-trustee-one-vote
as applied to the original position.) It is consistent with Rawlsian principles that the
number of fiduciaries not correspond exactly to the number of individuals on behalf of
which fiduciary duty is exercised. Indeed, this is a basic premise of the Rawlsian
approach. A trustee in the original position may be acting on behalf of an unknown
member of a future generation, and there are obviously many more of them than
members of the current generation. Thus, it does not violate the equality of voters, as
having the same fiduciary duty as the trustees (indeed delegated to them by the
trustees), that some voters act as fiduciaries for more individuals than other voters.
When setting up districts in order to represent the interests of individuals, however, the
goal is equalize the consideration of interests of the represented individuals-not to
equalize the number of individuals each fiduciary is responsible for.
74

See, e.g., J. HARVEY WILKINSON, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (2012).
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conception of democracy by insisting upon equal numbers of
eligible voters implementing the doctrine of one-person-one-vote.
Instead, at the very least, the states themselves should remain
free to embrace the Rawlsian conception of democracy if they
find it more persuasive. And for states to remain free to adopt
the Rawlsian view of voters as fiduciaries, they must be able to
draw districts based on equality of total population rather than
equal numbers of eligible voters. Thus, given the arguments of
this essay, the Court may constitutionalize the Rawlsian
account itself, or else let the states remain free to embrace the
Rawlsian account, but what the Court must not do is preclude
adoption of the Rawlsian account by constitutionalizing the
"consumer" conception of democracy.
C.

Civics Education and the Inculcation of Civic-Mindedness

Beyond the significance of Evenwel, the Rawlsian
perspective also draws attention to the need for high-quality
civics education. 75 Although the trustees would not require a
high-school education as a prerequisite to voting, they
nonetheless would want to put in place a curriculum that
prepared citizens appropriately for the fiduciary responsibility of
being a voter. Civics education thus would not be shunted as an
afterthought, subordinated to the so-called "STEM" subjects of
science, technology, engineering, and math. These other subjects
are undoubtedly important. Nonetheless, preparing citizens for
productive roles in the economy cannot be the only goal of public
education. Instead, public schools must address the societal
imperative, at least equally as important, of preparing citizens
for their role as voters.7 6
Nor would civics education be a matter of rote learning.
Instead, it would include education on the philosophy of
democracy itself, why voters are given the fiduciary
responsibilities they have, and what it means to cast a ballot as
an act of serving the best interests of society.77 Civics education
thus would be the training of voters for their role as fiduciaries,
just as military education trains citizens for their role
as soldiers.

'

See generally M. VICTORIA COSTA, RAWLS, CITIZENSHIP AND EDUCATION (2011).

'

See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 41-47 (1999).

n See id. at 48-70.
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If we were to embrace this Rawlsian perspective
wholeheartedly, we might consider other ways in which we could
enhance the capacity of voters to perform their fiduciary duty to
act on behalf of the public as a whole when electing lawmakers.
For example, we could consider the adoption of a "voter's oath"
analogous to the oaths that the legislators themselves must
affirm. Jurors and soldiers also have their own oaths,
appropriate for the particular kind of public service they
perform. Voters, too, could be given an oath, suitable for this
particular form of public service.
Indeed, Vermont is one state that has such a voter's oath.
Adopted in the eighteenth century, it has recently been
reaffirmed in the twenty-first. It states:
You solemnly swear or affirm that whenever you give
your vote or suffrage, touching any matter that concerns
the State of Vermont, you will do it so as in your
conscience you shall judge will most conduce to the best
good of the same, as established by the Constitution,
without fear or favor of any person.78
This oath captures the essence of the fiduciary obligation to
act in the overall public interest when serving as a voter. Were
this kind of voter's oath to be adopted more generally, it might
cause more voters to be in the appropriate public-service frame
of mind when they cast their ballots, rather than thinking of
how their vote might serve their own self-interest.7 9
CONCLUSION: RESPECTING THE TRUE IMPORTANCE OF VOTING

Thinking of voters as fiduciaries might also elevate the
value we attach to voting. When voting is considered simply a

VT. CONST. ch. II, § 42.
7
See Sanford Levinson, Taking Oaths Seriously, 2 YALE J. L. & HUM. 113 (1990)
(discussing efficacy of similar Connecticut oath, including references to earlier
scholarship on the point).
7
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form of self-expression,8 0 its status is inevitably limited by selfserving nature of this conception. 8 ' While self-expression
deserves protection in a free society, it is not an inherently noble
activity. The pursuit of self-interest, whether through voting or
otherwise, is ultimately about how best to benefit oneself. But
once voting is understood to be a mode of public service, it takes
on an entirely different character. It becomes a noble enterprise,
a high and solemn function that citizens perform on behalf of the
betterment of their commonwealth. If all of us collectively come
to understand voting in this way, we might eventually accord it
the significance and the protections it truly deserves.

* The theory of "expressive voting" posits that voting provides an intrinsic benefit
to voters by serving as a means of self-expression. See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & LOREN
LOMASKY, DEMOCRACY & DECISION: THE PURE THEORY OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCE
(1993).
s' See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1556
(1988) ("[Plolitical participation is not only instrumental in the ordinary sense; it is also
a vehicle for the inculcation of such characteristics as empathy, virtue, and feelings of
community.").

